

BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD  
STATE OF WASHINGTON

HAROLD B. and BERNIECE H. STOUT; )  
and LUWAYNE and ESTHER STOUT, )

Appellants, )

v. )

STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT )  
OF ECOLOGY, )

Respondent. )

PCHB No. 89-99

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,  
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

This matter, the appeal of the denial of an application to appropriate groundwater from the Starzman Lake Drainage in Okanogan County, came on for hearing on March 23, 1990, in Wenatchee, Washington, before the Pollution Control Hearings Board: Wick Dufford, presiding, and Judith A. Bendor, Chair.

Thomas Benner, Attorney at Law, appeared for appellants. The respondent was represented by P. Thomas McDonald, Assistant Attorney General. Kay Stevens of Steichen & Hewitt reported the evidentiary hearing. Closing argument was heard by telephone conference call on

1 material varies in depth from a few feet to 250 feet below land  
2 surface. The deepest layer of till, overlain by up to four feet of  
3 soil, is at the southern end of the basin.

### 4 III.

5 There are no perennial surface water streams in the basin. Water  
6 is found primarily in a water table aquifer contained within the  
7 overburden of till and soil above the bedrock. Small lakes and ponds  
8 scattered through the drainage are surface expressions of the water  
9 table. The groundwater of the basin drains southward into the  
10 Brewster Flat.

### 11 IV.

12 In May of 1979, Mildred A. Hancock applied to the Department of  
13 Ecology for a permit to appropriate groundwater for domestic supply  
14 and the irrigation of 40 acres in Section 25, Township 31 North, Range  
15 24 East, Willamette Meridian -- near the southern end of the Starzman  
16 Basin.

17 Later, in that same year, Ms. Hancock sold the property to the  
18 Stouts, the appellants in the instant case. The Stouts, believing  
19 water rights were not a problem, drilled a well in October of 1979.

20 Some year and a half later, on April 16, 1981, an assignment of  
21 the application for a groundwater permit was executed by Ms. Hancock  
22 (then Mildred Hancock-Rhay) in favor the the Stouts. This document,  
23 however, was not then filed with the Department of Ecology.

V.

1 In January, 1983, Ecology decided to grant the Hancock  
2 application and mailed its decision to Ms. Hancock at her last known  
3 address, requesting that permit fees be submitted. The permit fees  
4 were never tendered, and efforts to reach Ms. Hancock by telephone  
5 were unsuccessful. Absent the fees, Ecology issued no permit and  
6 cancelled the application. The cancellation apparently took place  
7 some time in 1983, but the precise date is not clear on this record.  
8 The Stouts were not notified.  
9

VI.

10 In 1984, Ecology's inspectors, having noted fluctuations in the  
11 water levels in the Starzman Basin, became concerned that the area  
12 might be either over-appropriated or approaching this condition. In a  
13 meeting with an Ecology inspector, the Stouts became aware of this  
14 concern and also learned for the first time that there appeared to be  
15 a problem with their right to take water from the well on the subject  
16 property.  
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18 In response, on April 5, 1984, the Stouts filed Application  
19 No. G4-28428, which is the subject of the instant case. The Stout  
20 application sought permission anew for the irrigation of the 40 acres  
21 covered by the cancelled Hancock application.  
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VII.

23 With Application No. G4-28428, the Stouts also forwarded to  
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1 Ecology a copy of the 1981 assignment of the Hancock application.  
2 Ecology's records bear a handwritten notation showing that someone had  
3 advised the agency of the sale of the realty to the Stouts prior to  
4 the cancellation of the Hancock application. However, Ecology had no  
5 notice of the assignment of that application until long after it was  
6 cancelled.

#### 7 VIII.

8 Ecology's concern for the availability of water in the Starzman  
9 Basin led to the initiation of a study of the matter in 1985. At the  
10 time, the agency had eight or nine pending applications for  
11 appropriations from the basin (including the Stouts') and were worried  
12 that the demand posed by this potential increase in use would result  
13 in overdraft of the resource. The agency was also aware of increasing  
14 residential development near the south end of the basin. Since  
15 domestic use of groundwater up to 5,000 gallons per day is exempt from  
16 the permit system, there was apprehension over additional use of the  
17 aquifer not accounted for in Ecology's records.

18 Accordingly, all applications were held until the study was  
19 completed.

#### 20 IX.

21 In March of 1987, Ecology produced a study entitled "Evaluation  
22 of the Water Resources within the Starzman Lake Watershed." The study  
23 was the product of both field work and review of agency records and  
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1 represented the joint efforts of agency's technical staff in  
2 hydrogeology and the inspectors working in the permit process.

3 Relevant findings of the study were that:

4 a) Recharge of the water table aquifer within the basin appears  
5 to be derived exclusively from precipitation which falls within the  
6 watershed boundaries.

7 b) Average annual precipitation falling on the drainage is  
8 approximately 11.7 inches.

9 c) Of the 11.7 inches of precipitation, only an estimated 1.2  
10 inches per year contributes to recharge.

11 d) The estimate of present potential demands on the resource by  
12 users is within three percent of the calculated annual recharge, a  
13 figure within the margin of error of the calculated recharge.

14 X.

15 Based on these findings, the study concluded that no additional  
16 groundwater was available for allocation within the basin. The  
17 underlying assumption was that allocations beyond the annual recharge  
18 figure would result in groundwater mining and eventually cause the  
19 basin to go dry.

20 XI.

21 The study did, however, note the existence of storage in the  
22 aquifer. Dividing the drainage into five different sub-areas based on  
23 the average thickness of the unconsolidated overburden, the study  
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1 estimated a storage capacity of around 12 times the average annual  
2 recharge or approximately 13,000 acre feet.

3 XII.

4 After the study was issued, Ecology waited two years before  
5 acting on any of the pending applications. The additional wait was to  
6 see if any allocations in the permit stage, and not yet actually  
7 appropriated, would fail to develop and be cancelled. After the two  
8 years, only 60 additional acre feet became available through this  
9 process.

10 XIII.

11 Ecology ruled on the pending applications in 1989, evaluating  
12 them in the order of their priority. Adopting a slightly more  
13 optimistic view than expressed in the study, the agency approved the  
14 two oldest applications. However, the rest of the pending requests  
15 were denied on the basis that the drainage is already fully  
16 appropriated.

17 XIV.

18 The conclusion of full appropriation rests on a discretionary  
19 determination to restrict the volume of water appropriated to a level  
20 approximating the average annual recharge. The purpose of this  
21 limitation is to prevent the mining of the aquifer.

22 In many drainages, Ecology has limited appropriations to as  
23 little as 50% of the average annual recharge. A greater level of  
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1 appropriation has been allowed here because the storage available  
2 provides a reserve seen as adequate to protect existing users in  
3 extended drought conditions.

4 XV.

5 The denial of the Stouts' application was issued June 30, 1989.  
6 The Stouts' appeal was filed with this Board on August 2, 1989. The  
7 appeal was given our cause number PCHB No. 89-99.

8 The appellants' contentions fall into two categories: one, that  
9 Ecology is wrong on its facts and two, that the Hancock application  
10 should have given them priority in relation to other pending  
11 applications.

12 XVI.

13 We were not persuaded by appellants' factual assertions. We find  
14 it more likely than not that recharge of the Starzman Basin aquifer is  
15 limited solely to precipitation on the overlying land. Water from the  
16 Brewster Flats Irrigation District would have to migrate upgradient to  
17 recharge the Starzman Basin. Moreover, the weight of evidence is that  
18 any other out-of-basin source for groundwater in the aquifer is  
19 precluded by granite barriers.

20 We find that the 11.7 inch average annual precipitation figure is  
21 an appropriate estimate, derived by accepted methods of estimation in  
22 the absence of site-specific data.

23 We find also that the 1.2 inch figure for average annual recharge  
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1 is a reasonable number, obtained again by means commonly employed and  
2 relied upon by hydrogeologists. The availability of real data for  
3 basin outflows from the two basins to the west (in many ways similar  
4 to the Starzman) enhances the credibility of this facet of the study.

5 We have no basis for disagreeing with the conclusion that return  
6 flows from irrigation in the basin are a negligible contributor to the  
7 aquifer. Accordingly, we do not believe that the average annual  
8 recharge calculation, determined by multiplying the 1.2 inches times  
9 the basin area, underestimates the total average annual recharge.

10 Furthermore, we think that the level of authorized withdrawals  
11 has been appropriately calculated and, given the unknown potential for  
12 exempt domestic water usage, the demand side of the equation appears  
13 reasonable.

14 XVII.

15 The Stouts do not reside on the subject property and have never  
16 used the well there for the irrigation of crops.

17 XVIII.

18 Any Conclusions of Law which is deemed a Finding of Fact is  
19 hereby adopted as such.

20 From these Findings of Fact the Board reaches the following

21 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

22 I.

23 The Board has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject  
24 matter. Chapters 43.21B, 90.44 and 90.03 RCW.



II.

The appeal before this Board relates to Ecology's action on Application No. G4-28428, an application filed on April 5, 1984. By that date, the Hancock application, initiated some five years earlier, had already been cancelled. No appeal of the cancellation was made to this Board. In the context of the present appeal filed in 1989, we perceive of no means by which the instant application can be made to relate back to the priority date of its cancelled predecessor.

III.

We express no opinion on the record made in this case in connection with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as it might relate to an action elsewhere to set aside the cancellation of the Hancock application.

We note, however, that the basic statute in providing for the assignment of permit applications requires the approval of such transfers by Ecology. Filing of assignments with the agency is an explicit statutory requirement. RCW 90.03.310.

Moreover, the reason a separate assignment of an application is needed is that the interest involved is not part of the associated realty. See Madison v. McNeal, 171 Wash. 669 (1933). Property rights associated with the use of water become appurtenant to the land only after the appropriation is perfected. RCW 90.03.380. Thus, notice that the realty has been transferred does not impart notice that the

1 personal property interest in any water rights application has also  
2 been transferred.

3 IV.

4 Appellants argue that Ecology should permit them to go ahead and  
5 appropriate and, then, turn to regulation if a problem becomes  
6 apparent.

7 Appellants are, of course, correct that the state of knowledge  
8 about water resources in the Startzman Basin is not perfect. But  
9 given a state of knowledge, risks appear high that further  
10 appropriations would result in groundwater mining to the detriment of  
11 prior appropriators. The water code is designed to anticipate and  
12 prevent this kind of trouble. Otherwise the application investigation  
13 system would have no function. All uses could be allowed to commence  
14 and then simply be regulated on the basis of priority. Those who  
15 invested in water developments and guessed wrong would just have to  
16 suffer the consequences. The statutory permit system is intended to  
17 head off such problems before they occur. In large measure, the state  
18 water agency's task is prevention, not enforcement. See Black Star  
19 Ranch v. Eckerich, PCHB 87-19 (1988).

20 V.

21 The circumstances surrounding instant application are closely  
22 analogous to those in Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wn.2d 109,  
23 685 P.2d 1068 (1984). There the determination of a permit  
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1 application was governed in large measure by the outcome of a detailed  
2 study of water availability carried out by experts. Their work was  
3 based on a reasonable level of data acquisition and research, leading  
4 to educated estimates of supply and demand. Such an effort was  
5 recognized as an appropriate and adequate means for carrying out  
6 Ecology's investigative responsibilities on an individual  
7 application. We conclude that Ecology's investigation in this case  
8 satisfied the requirement of RCW 90.03.290 to "investigate all facts  
9 relevant and material to the application."

10 VI.

11 Ecology's decision here is also governed by the four substantive  
12 criteria of RCW 90.03.290: (1) beneficial use, (2) availability of  
13 public water, (3) non-impairment of existing rights, and (4) the  
14 public interest. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn.2d  
15 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).

16 The problem in the instant case is most simply described as one  
17 of water availability, although, as often happens, there is an overlap  
18 with the existing rights and public interest categories. What is  
19 involved is a discretionary decision, legislatively assigned to  
20 Ecology's good judgment. See Schuh v. Department of Ecology, 100  
21 Wn.2d 180, 667 P.2d 64 (1983); Peterson v. Department of Ecology, 92  
22 Wn.2d 306, 596 P.2d 285 (1979).

VII.

Fundamentally, the discretionary decision in the case at bar concerns the question of mining water. RCW 90.44.130 requires Ecology to regulate the use of groundwater so that a "safe sustaining yield" is maintained for prior appropriators and "overdraft" is avoided.

This does not mean that stored groundwater may never be taken. It means, rather, that the appropriation of waters in excess of annual recharge can be allowed only under circumstances where the ability of existing rightholders to fully satisfy their rights by reasonable means can be guaranteed. Generally this will require a very large aquifer with a substantial quantity of water in storage, managed through a cautious program of drawdown that does not completely exhaust the resource. See Shinn & Masto v. Department of Ecology, PCHB No. 648, et al (1975). Chapter 173-130A WAC.

Under the facts of the instant case, however, we apprehend no reason to substitute a different judgment for the discretionary determination made by Ecology. Here the aquifer is small in area and largely shallow in depth. The aquifer does not contain extensive storage and lies in an area of limited precipitation even in the best of years. The decision to limit withdrawals to the average annual recharge is only prudent in the circumstances. Senior appropriators are to be protected even when the average is not reached.

VIII.

In short, we conclude that Ecology was correct when it concluded as to Application No. G4-28428 that water is not available for the proposed use because Starzman Lake Drainage Basin is fully appropriated and that existing water resources are needed to satisfy existing rights.

IX.

Having once been the recipient of a groundwater application assignment, appellants might now again consider the possibilities of purchase of the water rights they seek. Moreover, they might also give thought to filing yet another application for the same project, to improve their position in line to receive water which might become available in the future (i.e., water not appropriated by those under permit or forfeited for non-use by those with perfected rights).

X.

Any Finding of Fact which is deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

From these conclusions of Law the Board enters the following

ORDER

The denial of Application No. G4-28428 is sustained.

DONE this 18th day of May, 1990.

POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD

Wick Dufford  
WICK DUFFORD, Presiding

Judith A. Bendor  
JUDITH A. BENDOR, Chair

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,  
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